




















In a small macroeconomic model of the Colombian economy I investigate the problem 
of selecting a policy rule that is consistent with inflation targeting. I spell out the 
characteristics of the optimal feedback and output parameters in the rule, as well as for 
the optimal forecasting horizon for inflation targeting. Using stochastic simulations of 
the model it is found that, as expected, rules that use forecasts of inflation rather than 
just contemporaneous inflation have better stabilization properties.  
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Around the world monetary authorities meet periodically to determine whether the 
monetary policy stance is consistent with their short and mid term targets. Those 
meetings revolves around the change in the tactics or strategies in order to meet the 
targets. In the early nineties central bankers of many countries like New Zealand, 
Canada, the United Kingdom, among others, adopted the inflation targeting strategy as 
one of the means to control inflation. In recent years, many other countries such as 
Colombia and Chile have also adopted the inflation targeting strategy. Within this 
context, monetary authorities need tools and some criteria to gauge the efficiency of 
macroeconomic policy. 
 
Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) characterized inflation targeting as “constraint discretion” 
where there is ample scope for discretionary input into any rule. However, in order to 
evaluate the efficacy of the policy, the inflation targeting strategy should amount to a 
well-defined monetary policy-rule. Based on previous research on monetary policy 
rules, that have demonstrated the efficacy of simple rules, in this paper I explore the 
characteristics that a well-defined policy rule should have for inflation targeting in 
Colombia. I generate the inflation-output variability frontiers as introduced in Taylor 
(1979), to investigate what kind of reaction function is more efficient in terms of 
minimization of output gap, inflation and instrument variability. 
 
The reminder of the paper is as follows. In section 2 a brief description of the output-
variability trade-off is given. In section 3 the concept of the Taylor rule is introduced. A 
discussion about the lags in the monetary policy and the ability of Inflation forecast 
rules to embrace the forward looking dimension that the monetary policy should have is 
presented in section 4. In sections 5 and 6 I describe two basic ingredients needed to 
evaluate the performance of any monetary policy rule; the objective function of the 
monetary authorities and the model that describes de economy. In section 7, policy 
frontiers based on Taylor rules and Inflation Forecast Based rules are computed. The 
optimal policy rule for the Colombian economy is presented in section 8. Section 9 
contains a brief summary and conclusion. 
 
 
2. The Output-Inflation Variability Trade-off  
 
In the economics literature it has been argued that there exists a trade-off between the 
size of the fluctuations in inflation and the size of the fluctuations in real output. In the 
context of the evaluation of the efficiency of the macroeconomic policies, this means 
that in the conduction of monetary policy it is useful to construct and estimate a 
variability trade-off between inflation and unemployment in terms of their fluctuations 
over time rather than in terms of a single decision made at a single point in time. 
Focusing on the long-term, which consist of many short-runs, results in a better 
evaluation of monetary policy.  
 
The idea of the output-inflation variability trade-off is shown in chart 1. Inefficient 
macroeconomic policies would lead to outcomes above the curve with both inflation 
fluctuations and unemployment fluctuations higher than could be achieved with better 
policies. Hence points moving to the south-west in Figure 1 signal an improvement in  3
policy performance and conversely, points to the north east signal a worsening policy 
performance. The efficient frontiers, defined in Taylor (1979), are the locus of the 
lowest achievable combination of inflation and output variability. In addition, on the 
frontier, one must view reduced output stability as the opportunity cost of improved 
inflation stability.  
 






















The response of monetary policy to macroeconomic shocks helps determine how large 
the effects on real output or inflation will be. For example, suppose that the economy is 
in a state where real output equals potential output and inflation is steady, and suppose 
that there is an upward demand shock. It causes real output to rise above potential and 
there will be inflationary pressures. The monetary authority could respond in two ways. 
The first response could be to tighten policy sharply in order to control the inflation 
rate, but it might cause a slow down in the real activity. In this case the response results 
in more inflation stability and less real output stability. The second response could be to 
use a more cautious monetary policy that might have less effect in controlling the rise in 
inflation, but it will have a smaller negative effect on real output. Depending on what 
the monetary authority decides, its monetary policy helps determine the inflation and 
output stability. 
 
3.  The Efficient Frontiers and the Taylor Rule 
 
Efficient policy rules for the conduction of monetary policies are defined to be those 
that deliver the lowest achievable combination of inflation and output variability given 
the structure of the model economy under consideration.  
 
Taylor (1993) proposed an explicit instrument rule for policy that today is known as the 
Taylor rule. Under such a reaction function, the nominal level of the interest rate is 
determined by the current level of two variables, the deviation of inflation from a target 
and to the deviation of actual output from potential, so:  4
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where r
* is the equilibrium real interest rate. 
Taylor (1993) suggested a weight of 0.5 on the output gap and on the inflation deviation 
from target. However, virtually all attempts to estimate the Taylor rule empirically 
require the addition of a lagged dependent variable in order to fit well. This means that 
central banks have tried historically to smooth interest rates changes. Thus the common 
practice among central banks is to make long series of small steps in the same direction. 
This behavioural pattern is partly picked up in the econometrics for the Taylor rule, in 
the guise of the near-unity value of the lagged dependent variable. John Taylor (1998) 
has studied the comparative virtues of rules of that include the lagged dependent 
variable. He concludes that it is allright for the authorities to act slowly in a series of 
cautious steps, just as long as a forward-looking public can effectively undo such 
cautious lags by immediate anticipation. Interest rate rules which respond with a lag 
assume that people will expect later increases in interest rates if such increases are 
needed to reduce inflation. 
 
4. Lags in the monetary transmission mechanism and Inflation Forecast Based 
Rules  
 
It has long been recognized that monetary policy needs a forward-looking dimension. 
As Milton Friedman noted, the monetary policy transmission mechanism has “long and 
variable lags.” The Taylor rule sets an interest rate path on the basis of current or lagged 
values of output and inflation. By contrast, inflation-targeting central banks focus on 
inflation forecasts rather than in their actual values. In these central banks, forecasts of 
future inflation and output play a key role in the monetary policy decision-making 
process. 
 
Inflation Forecasts Based rules (IFB rules) are rules with response to a rule-consistent 
inflation forecast. The result is an inflation forecasts always returning to the target. 
Consider the following forecast-based rule 
) ( ) ( * *
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where Et(•) =  Et(• | Φt), where Φt is the information set available at time t and E is the 
mathematical expectations operator. According to the rule, the monetary authorities 
control deterministically nominal interest rates (it) so as to hit a path for the short-term 
real interest rate. This kind of policy rule is a useful prescriptive tool because deviations 
of expected inflation (the feedback variable) from the inflation target (the policy goal) 
prescribe remedial policy actions. The rule implies that if new information makes the 
inflation forecast at horizon k increase, the interest rate should be increased, and vice 
versa.  
 
This rule, is not an explicit instrument rule because it does not express the instrument as 
an explicit function of current information. The rule is an equilibrium condition because 
the right side is endogenous and depends on the rule itself.  However, the rule in (2) is 
not derived as a first-order condition of some loss function corresponding to inflation 
targeting. Therefore it is important to know how efficient this rule is in achieving the  5
monetary authorities’ targets? Three ingredients will help us to determine the relative 
efficiency of a policy rule; the model economy under consideration, the structure of 
shocks, and the monetary authority’s objective function (or loss function). 
 
In the next sections, I will consider the performance of simple Taylor rules and IFB 
rules in an inflation targeting framework for Colombia. This is made by embedding the 
various rules in a small macro model, Model of Transmission Mechanism (MMT) and 
evaluating the resulting (unconditional) moments of the arguments typically thought to 
enter the central banks’ loss function (output, inflation and the policy instrument). 
Specifically, following Taylor (1993), we consider where each of the rules places the 
economy on the output-inflation variability frontier.   
 
 
5.  The monetary authorities objective function  
 
As in Batini and Nelson (2000), we will interpret “inflation targeting” as having a loss 
function for monetary policy where deviations of inflation from an explicit inflation 
target are always given some weight, λπ, but not necessarily all the weight. Strict 
inflation targeting refers to the situation where only inflation enters the loss function, 
while “flexible” inflation targeting allows other goal variables. 
 
In the optimization exercises used to derive the optimal policy rule, this is the function 
that is being minimized. And when comparing the performance of rules like (1) or (2), 
this loss function is used to compute welfare losses in all experiments. In particular for a 
discount factor β, 0<β<1, we consider the loss function given by: 
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We use standard weights used in the inflation targeting literature, with β=0.99, λπ = 1, 
λy=1 and λ∆i =0.5. It means that loss is calculated under the assumption that output and 
inflation variability are equally distasteful and variations in the costs of variability of 
interest-rate changes receives a penalty half that of the other terms.  
 
6. The Model 
 
Model of Transmission Mechanism (MMT) is a forward-looking open economy 
structural model. It has similarities with the optimizing IS-LM framework developed by 
McCallum and Nelson (1999), Svensson (1999) and Ball (1998). Most of the structural 
equations of the model are estimated. Some of them are calibrated to match the dynamic 
path of output and inflation during the recent past years
2.  
 
The model comprises seven behavioral relationships, listed as equations (4) through 
(10) below:  
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2  Gomez, Uribe and Vargas (2002), present a more detailed description of the model.  6
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All variables, except interest and inflation rates, are in logarithms. Equation (4) is an IS 
curve. Output gap depends on lags of itself, and deviations from equilibrium levels of 
the real interest rate, the terms of trade, the real exchange rate, the output gap of the 
United States and a demand shock.  
 
Equations (5) to (7) define the models’ supply side. Equation (5) is an open-economy 
Phillips curve expressed in terms of non-food inflation,  nf
t π
3. The non-food inflation 
depends on the the mixed backward-forward looking term, the lagged change in the 
imported goods price, m
t π , lag of the output gap, and a supply shock.  
 
Equation (6) is the models’ equation for the food inflation in Colombia according to a 
model developed by Avella (2001). It is determined by non-food inflation, lags of food 
inflation, and the rainfall deficit,  t A . In equation (7), CPI inflation is expressed as a 
convex combination of non-food inflation and food inflation. 
 
Equation (8) is an identity that relates the inflation of imported goods to the foreign 
inflation,  and the nominal rate of depreciation of the exchange rate. 
 
Equation (9) posits a link between the differential of domestic and foreign real interest 
rate and the real exchange rate. It captures the idea that a rise in the interest rate makes 
domestic assets more attractive, leading to an appreciation. The shock  t ψ  captures other 
influences on the exchange rate, such as investors’ confidence. 
 
Finally, equation (10) is the transmission between the market nominal interest rates
4, 
t i and the central banks’ policy nominal interest rate,  p
t i . In this equation  t zi is the 
long-run relationship between the rates. 
 
The model is to be closed with a policy rule that should be chosen in such a way that it 
places the economy on the efficient output-inflation variability frontier and it is possible 
                                                 
3  Where,  nf
t π is the quarterly annual inflation in the consumer price index excluding food items,  
4 The market nominal interest rate is the 90 days CD’s.  7
to minimize the welfare losses. In the following section, I compare the performance of 
some rules and choose the optimal policy rule.  
 
7. Efficient policy rules 
 
In this section, we start comparing the performance of Taylor rules and inflation-
forecast-based rules by generating the inflation-output variability frontiers to investigate 
the general properties of each of this kind of rules.  
 
The frontiers are traced out for what might be termed “reasonable” preferences over 
inflation and output variability as described in the quadratic loss function in equation 
(3). Stochastic simulations of the model and a grid search technique over policy rule 
coefficient are employed to trace out the efficient frontier
5.  For each rule considered, 
the resulting moments are calculated by averaging the results from 100 draws, each of 
which is simulated over a 25-year horizon.  The measures of variability used are the root 
mean squared deviation (RMSD) of inflation from its target and output from potential 
output. 
 
 7.1 Performance of Taylor rules 
 
Here we close the MMT described in section six with a variety of Taylor rules that are 
characterized by any policy rule where the central banks’ policy nominal interest rate 
responds to the contemporaneous deviation of output from potential and non-food 
inflation from target.  
 
) ( ) ( ) ( * * *
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Similarly to Drew and Hunt (1999), I examined 9 combinations on the 
contemporaneous output gap ranging from 0.25 to 3, with 7 weights on the 
contemporaneous deviation of inflation from target, ranging from 0.25 to 3, in order to 
trace out the efficient frontier under Taylor rules.   
 
The output-inflation variability pairs achieved are graphed in chart 2.  The thin line with 
label δy = 0.25 corresponds to the inflation-output variability achieved by holding the 
weight on the output gap fixed at 0.25 and increasing the weight on the inflation gap 
from 0.25 (point A) to 3 (point B). Increasing δy to 0.5 shifts the trade-off curve towards 
the origin, as illustrated in chart 2. Increasing δy up to 3 continues to shift the trade-off 
curve towards the origin. No appreciable shifts occur with δy values larger than 6. The 
thick line trace out the corresponding globally efficient frontier for the Taylor rules.  
 
                                                 
5 The model and the policy rule are subject to a sequence of macroeconomic shocks.  Here we consider 














































7.2   Performance of IFB rules 
 
As explained before, these rules adjust to the policy instrument in response to a model-
consistent projection of the deviation of inflation from its target rate: 







t E r i π π α π π − + + = +  
 
The parameters { π α and k} are a calibration choice in this stage of the study. The 
targeting horizon, k,  goes from 2 to 12. The weights,  π α , range in value from 0.25 to 3. 
In chart 3, the thin line with  5 . 0 = π α is derived using a weight of 0.5 on the projected 
deviation of inflation from its target and varying the forward-looking targeting horizon. 
The line AB joins these simulation points. Moving along the locus of points from A to 











































The thin line with   0 . 1 = π α shows the results of the simulations when the weight on the 
projected inflation gap is increased to 1.0. Increasing the weight reduces inflation and 
output variability for targeting horizons that start at k=6 and beyond.  Once the weights 
reach a level of  2.25, reduced inflation variability can only be achieved at the expenses 
of increased output variability at all targeting horizons examined. At this point, the thick 
line starts to trace out the globally efficient frontier for IFB rules.  
 
7.3 Comparing inflation-forecast-based rules and Taylor rules 
 
In chart 4, the globally efficient frontiers under inflation-forecast-based and Taylor rules 
are compared. Policy rules that respond to forecasts of future inflation seem to perform 
well in quantitative simulations. Taylor rules are able to achieve lower output variability 



























For different policy rules specifications, table 1 shows volatility of the goal variables 
(measured as the unconditional standard deviations)
6, and the stochastic welfare loss, L. 
Looking at the performance of the Taylor rules, it is clear that placing a higher weight 
on output than on inflation yields welfare improvements only until certain point but 
with higher weights the welfare loss starts increasing again. Second, simple forecast-
based rules perform favourably compared with simple Taylor rules. For example, the 
best-performing Taylor rule delivers a welfare loss higher than the welfare loss coming 
from a forecast-based rule with parameters {k=6, απ=2.0}. 
 
This is evidence of the information-encompasing nature of inflation-forecast-based 
rules. An inflation forecast is formed conditioned on all variables that affect future 
inflation and output dynamics, not just output and inflation themselves. Even an 
apparently simple, forecast-based rule is implicitly responding to a wide and complex 
set of macroeconomic variables. This is a property of forecast-based rules broadly 
documented since Svensson and Rudebusch (1998).  
 
Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
Inflation forecast based  rules
4.82 5.86 5.44 72.34
4.68 6.40 5.42 77.64
4.87 3.66 4.01 45.14
4.38 4.38 4.38 47.86
Taylor-type rules
4.09 5.30 6.19 64.00
3.58 4.55 6.97 57.85
3.09 4.27 9.66 74.37
 Standard Deviation of
Table 1.             Comparing Inflation Forecast Based rules and Taylor rules
5 . 0 , 3 = = π α k
5 . 0 , 6 = = π α k
, 5 . 0 = 0.5 = y δ α π
, 5 . 0 = 1.0 = y δ α π
0 . 2 , 3 = = π α k
0 . 2 , 6 = = π α k




7.4. The efficient policy rule for a model of the Colombian economy. 
 
In the previous section it was shown that inflation forecast-based-rules are more 
efficient than Taylor rules in the context of inflation targeting. This is a familiar result 
found also in other countries targeting inflation directly. Now the exploration has to do 
with the features of an optimal inflation-forecast-based rule for the Colombian economy 
given the MMT described in section six. In addition to the parameters απ and k, I also 
will investigate if a smoothing parameter, ρ, should be taken into account in the policy 
rule. The goal is to find the combination of parameters {απ, k, ρ} that will provide the 









t i E r i 1
* * * ) ( ) ( − + + − + + = ρ π π α π π  
                                                 
6 Here considered the resulting moments are also calculated by averaging the results from 100 draws, 
each of which is simulated over a 25-year horizon.  
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The volatility of the goal variables (measured as the unconditional standard deviations), 
and the stochastic welfare loss (L ), are reported in table 2. There, it is provided the 
results for various combinations of the parameters απ  and  ρ. In terms of welfare loss, 
the policy rules with a smoothing parameter, ρ, lower than 0.25 and feedback parameter, 
απ, between 1.75 and 2.25 perform better in general. This is mainly due to a lower output 
and instrument variability. According to these results, the efficient combination of 
parameters {απ , ρ} is απ = 2.0 and  ρ = 0.0.  
 
The results are very robust to changes in the weights that are assigned to the three goal 
variables on the monetary authorities’ objective function. In table 3, it was set the same 
weight on each of the goal variables and the resulting efficient combination of 
parameters is απ = 1.5 and ρ = 0.0. This combination is very similar to the one from the 
baseline case chosen before. In table 4, more weight on inflation stability is put, there, 
the first best is the combination of parameters απ = 1.75 ρ = 0.25, and the second best is 
again the combination απ = 2.0 and ρ = 0.0. In table 5, it is assigned more weight to 
output stabilization than to the other two variables. In that case, the smoothing 
parameter is still zero and the feedback parameter is a little lower than 2.0 and 1.5. 
 
Finally I explore the optimal forecast horizon parameter,  k. Chart 5 plots the locus of 
output-inflation variability points delivered by the IFB rule given the efficient 
parameters {απ , ρ}. The values of k that are used are 0, 1, …, 12. Moving along the 
locus of points from A to B, the simulations use a policy rule with a progressively more 
distant inflation forecast horizon. So, point A shows the pair of inflation/output 
variability associated with the policy rule when k=0, and point B gives the pair of 
inflation/output variabilities associated with a policy rule that responds to expected 















































The optimal inflation forecast horizon is also found by minimizing the loss function. In 
table 3 we report the welfare loss for each forecast horizon. In the model, the optimal 
forecast horizon lies somewhere in between, at around six to eight quarters.  12
 
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.58 7.16 5.54 87.49
1.00 4.42 5.18 5.67 62.36
1.50 4.37 4.41 6.00 56.44
1.75 4.36 4.15 6.19 55.38
2.00 4.38 3.96 6.38 55.22
2.25 4.43 3.65 6.73 55.62
2.50 4.51 3.46 7.10 57.50
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.62 6.78 5.47 82.33
1.00 4.47 4.94 5.67 60.44
1.50 4.45 4.22 6.08 56.07
1.75 4.47 4.01 6.33 56.14
2.00 4.51 3.81 6.51 56.09
2.25 4.53 3.67 6.71 56.42
2.50 4.55 3.53 6.82 56.40
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.68 6.40 5.42 77.64
1.00 4.55 4.68 5.63 58.51
1.50 4.57 4.07 6.23 56.94
1.75 4.61 3.82 6.39 56.21
2.00 4.66 3.67 6.65 57.31
2.25 4.70 3.53 6.85 57.95
2.50 4.79 3.43 7.09 59.92
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.77 5.97 5.32 72.42
1.00 5.25 3.05 7.41 64.24
1.50 4.76 3.87 6.35 57.84
1.75 5.08 3.26 6.86 59.97
2.00 5.14 3.13 7.10 61.42
2.25 5.25 3.05 7.41 64.24
2.50 5.25 3.05 7.41 64.24
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.92 5.56 5.24 68.84
1.00 4.94 4.22 5.86 59.38
1.50 5.11 3.69 6.53 61.04
1.75 5.30 3.55 7.01 65.27
2.00 5.47 3.44 7.46 69.54
2.25 5.71 3.36 7.94 75.38
2.50 5.92 3.29 8.43 81.33
 Standard deviation of
 Standard deviation of
Table 2. Results on Volatility and Loss with Various IFB Rules
(λπ  = 1,    λy = 1,  λ∆i = 0.5)






 Standard deviation of
 Standard deviation of
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απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.58 7.16 5.54 102.84
1.00 4.42 5.18 5.67 78.41
1.50 4.37 4.41 6.00 74.41
1.75 4.36 4.15 6.19 74.54
2.00 4.38 3.96 6.38 75.60
2.25 4.43 3.65 6.73 78.30
2.50 4.51 3.46 7.10 82.68
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.62 6.78 5.47 97.32
1.00 4.47 4.94 5.67 76.51
1.50 4.45 4.22 6.08 74.54
1.75 4.47 4.01 6.33 76.17
2.00 4.51 3.81 6.51 77.26
2.25 4.53 3.67 6.71 78.91
2.50 4.55 3.53 6.82 79.65
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.68 6.40 5.42 92.34
1.00 4.55 4.68 5.63 74.38
1.50 4.57 4.07 6.23 76.37
1.75 4.61 3.82 6.39 76.61
2.00 4.66 3.67 6.65 79.44
2.25 4.70 3.53 6.85 81.39
2.50 4.79 3.43 7.09 85.07
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.77 5.97 5.32 86.54
1.00 5.25 3.05 7.41 91.68
1.50 4.76 3.87 6.35 77.98
1.75 5.08 3.26 6.86 83.51
2.00 5.14 3.13 7.10 86.65
2.25 5.25 3.05 7.41 91.68
2.50 5.25 3.05 7.41 91.68
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.92 5.56 5.24 82.55
1.00 4.94 4.22 5.86 76.54
1.50 5.11 3.69 6.53 82.39
1.75 5.30 3.55 7.01 89.85
2.00 5.47 3.44 7.46 97.33
2.25 5.71 3.36 7.94 106.88
2.50 5.92 3.29 8.43 116.86
ρ = 0.375
 Standard deviation of
ρ = 0.50
 Standard deviation of
ρ = 0.125
 Standard deviation of
ρ = 0.25
 Standard deviation of
Table 3. Results on Volatility and Loss with Various IFB Rules
(λπ  = 1,    λy = 1,  λ∆i = 1.0)
ρ = 0.0
 Standard deviation of 14
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.58 7.16 5.54 77.02
1.00 4.42 5.18 5.67 52.60
1.50 4.37 4.41 6.00 46.91
1.75 4.36 4.15 6.19 45.88
2.00 4.38 3.96 6.38 45.65
2.25 4.43 3.65 6.73 45.83
2.50 4.51 3.46 7.10 47.33
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.62 6.78 5.47 71.67
1.00 4.47 4.94 5.67 50.46
1.50 4.45 4.22 6.08 46.18
1.75 4.47 4.01 6.33 46.14
2.00 4.51 3.81 6.51 45.90
2.25 4.53 3.67 6.71 46.18
2.50 4.55 3.53 6.82 46.04
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.68 6.40 5.42 66.67
1.00 4.55 4.68 5.63 48.15
1.50 4.57 4.07 6.23 46.48
1.75 4.61 3.82 6.39 45.61
2.00 4.66 3.67 6.65 46.46
2.25 4.70 3.53 6.85 46.92
2.50 4.79 3.43 7.09 48.43
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.77 5.97 5.32 61.06
1.00 5.25 3.05 7.41 50.48
1.50 4.76 3.87 6.35 46.49
1.75 5.08 3.26 6.86 47.08
2.00 5.14 3.13 7.10 48.22
2.25 5.25 3.05 7.41 50.48
2.50 5.25 3.05 7.41 50.48
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.92 5.56 5.24 56.72
1.00 4.94 4.22 5.86 47.18
1.50 5.11 3.69 6.53 48.01
1.75 5.30 3.55 7.01 51.21
2.00 5.47 3.44 7.46 54.58
2.25 5.71 3.36 7.94 59.07
2.50 5.92 3.29 8.43 63.83
ρ = 0.375
 Standard deviation of
ρ = 0.50
 Standard deviation of
ρ = 0.125
 Standard deviation of
ρ = 0.25
 Standard deviation of
Table 4. Results on Volatility and Loss with Various IFB Rules
(λπ  = 1,    λy = 0.5,  λ∆i = 0.5)
ρ = 0.0
 Standard deviation of 15
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.58 7.16 5.54 61.89
1.00 4.42 5.18 5.67 48.96
1.50 4.37 4.41 6.00 46.74
1.75 4.36 4.15 6.19 46.77
2.00 4.38 3.96 6.38 47.37
2.25 4.43 3.65 6.73 48.94
2.50 4.51 3.46 7.10 51.51
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.62 6.78 5.47 59.32
1.00 4.47 4.94 5.67 48.23
1.50 4.45 4.22 6.08 47.16
1.75 4.47 4.01 6.33 48.08
2.00 4.51 3.81 6.51 48.82
2.25 4.53 3.67 6.71 49.69
2.50 4.55 3.53 6.82 50.18
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.68 6.40 5.42 57.14
1.00 4.55 4.68 5.63 47.55
1.50 4.57 4.07 6.23 48.65
1.75 4.61 3.82 6.39 48.91
2.00 4.66 3.67 6.65 50.57
2.25 4.70 3.53 6.85 51.73
2.50 4.79 3.43 7.09 54.03
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.77 5.97 5.32 54.62
1.00 5.25 3.05 7.41 59.60
1.50 4.76 3.87 6.35 50.34
1.75 5.08 3.26 6.86 54.65
2.00 5.14 3.13 7.10 56.53
2.25 5.25 3.05 7.41 59.60
2.50 5.25 3.05 7.41 59.60
απ Welfare Loss
output inflation interest  rates L 
0.50 4.92 5.56 5.24 53.39
1.00 4.94 4.22 5.86 50.47
1.50 5.11 3.69 6.53 54.23
1.75 5.30 3.55 7.01 58.97
2.00 5.47 3.44 7.46 63.63
2.25 5.71 3.36 7.94 69.75
2.50 5.92 3.29 8.43 75.93
ρ = 0.375
 Standard deviation of
ρ = 0.50
 Standard deviation of
ρ = 0.125
 Standard deviation of
ρ = 0.25
 Standard deviation of
Table 5. Results on Volatility and Loss with Various IFB Rules
(λπ  = 0.5,    λy = 1.0,  λ∆i = 0.5)
ρ = 0.0




Using stochastic simulations of a macroeconomic model of the Colombian economy, 
MMT, we examined the relative performance of two classes of policy rules. For this 
purpose, I used as evaluation criteria the unconditional standard deviations of the goal 
variables, and a standard stochastic welfare loss function from a monetary authority that 
undertakes flexible inflation targeting.  
 
The results are that Taylor rules can achieve lower output variability than IFB rules, but 
the inflation and instrument variability are too high. In terms of welfare loss, IFB rules 
perform better than Taylor rules. Consequently, a well-defined monetary policy-rule for 
the Colombian economy should incorporate a forward looking dimension. It is 
important to keep in mind that even though in the IFB rules the current period output 
gap does not enter explicitly, its endogenous solution is an important part of the 
information set that is taken into account in the inflation forecast.  
 
The results from the stochastic simulations are that the efficient combination of 
parameters in the IFB rule for this macroeconomic model is an inflation feedback 
parameter of 2.0, a smoothing parameter of 0.0 and an optimal forecast horizon between 
six and eight quarters. This policy horizon supports the view that inflation targeting in 
practice should be designed so that the target is achieved over the medium term.   
Finally, this parameter values are robust to reasonable changes in the weights given to 
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